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In Praise of Richard Weisberg’s Intransigence
DRAFT
Robin West
In early essays on Herman Melville’s Billy Budd, Sailor, Richard Weisberg
startled the literary and legal academic world with a novel claim: Captain Vere, he
argued, far from being a tragic hero resigned to the moral and legal necessity of an
unpopular act, as he had been commonly understood, was a murderer.1 His
summary execution of Billy Budd for the killing of Claggart, Weisberg showed, was
neither required, excused, nor justified by the Mutiny Act and the Laws of War
under which Vere acted, and to which, as Captain of his wartime ship, he was bound.
Acting as judge, juror, witness, prosecutor and defense counsel all, and arguing
Budd’s case in front of a tribunal consisting entirely of his own subordinates, Vere
engineered an unreviewable conviction and death sentence, contrary to both the
letter and spirit of the governing positive law.2 The trial, conviction and execution
of Billy Budd were all unlawful. Vere was both morally responsible and legally
culpable for Billy Budd’s death.
Why was Weisberg’s claim – that Captain Vere manipulated law and passion
both, all so as to kill a popular sailor and for no good reason, much less out of moral
or legal necessity – so novel, and even, as I want to suggest below, path-breaking?
Not so much because of anything in the letter of Melville’s story. Melville had
provided sufficient evidence of Vere’s mendacity and criminality both to sustain
Weisberg’s eventual verdict.3 Rather, I suggest, Weisberg’s argument regarding the
criminality of the commanding officer depicted in Billy Budd was such a surprise
because of particular features of mid-to-late twentieth century intellectual thought,
particularly in the legal academy, which taken jointly rendered Weisberg’s legal
interpretation of the law in Billy Budd – and the indictment not of Budd but of
Captain Vere, which that interpretation implied – all but unthinkable. In retrospect,
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thirty years later, I believe that its clear that Richard Weisberg’s compelling
interpretation of Billy Budd, Sailor – particularly when that interpretation is read in
the context of his larger and later oeuvre on related themes – suggested a much
needed corrective, not only of our understanding of Melville’s story, but also of our
conventional and critical jurisprudence. It suggested the case, more specifically, for
moving both our conventional legal thinking away from its focus on the unjust law,
and focusing instead on the duplicitous or unjust adjudicator, and for moving our
critical sensibility away from its still-dominant commitments to indeterminacy, legal
skepticism, and interpretive flexibility, and toward an appreciation of the virtues of
legal intransigence. By so doing, Weisberg’s claims about the nature of
interpretation laid out a jurisprudential path not only for the law and literature
movement, but for legal studies generally, characterized by very basic moral
decency and intellectual integrity.
In this brief appreciation I won’t re-litigate Weisberg’s ultimate judgment on
Vere; I think he’s amply prosecuted his case, both in the original essays in which he
put forward his claim and in his subsequent responses to critics.4 I would though
like to show why the argument he gave and the conclusion he reached were so
startling. Why was it, in short, that Weisberg’s view of Vere as an anti-hero, rather
than as a hero, was such an outlier? Put differently, why was it that for seven
decades, well over half a century, Vere’s villainy was so obscure, and more pointedly
so obscure to so many legally sophisticated readers? To state my conclusion up
front: I will ultimately argue that Vere’s criminal mendacity has been obscure to
most legal readers of the last seven decades largely because of the dominant
jurisprudence, or legal theories, regarding the nature of law and interpretation of
that time period – roughly the duration of the novel’s existence. Weisberg’s reading
of Billy Budd and his understanding of Vere’s character rest on a conception of law
and legal meaning distinctively outside all of our received jurisprudential traditions.
It is a reading of the novel, and a conception of law, from which we could all profit.
So, in the first part below, I will put forward an account of why it was that
Richard Weisberg could see clearly what was beyond the reach to most of Billy
Budd’s professional readers for the duration of the book’s life, both in law and in
literature: that Melville’s Vere, far from being a loyal wartime hero who sacrificed
his own popularity and peace of mind in order to do the right and lawful thing, was
actually homicidal; a murderous commander who invoked a hyped and self-serving
emergency in order to dispense with accepted legal and procedural safeguards, his
own moral compass, the dissenting voices of his compatriots, and Billy’s life all. In
the second part, I will turn to Weisberg’s recent defense of legal intransigence, made
implicitly in these early essays on Budd and explicitly in later work. In that section I
will suggest some reasons we should attend more carefully than we have to date to
the case Weisberg has made for intransigence and against “flexibility” in law and
4
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jurisprudence – particularly when crafted as Vere-styled juridical responses to
perceived emergencies – and whether the case for legal flexibility is propounded by
military Commanders on ships of war, natural lawyers, critical legal scholars,
Supreme Court Justices, or liberal legal devotees of judicial discretion, particularly in
constitutional law. I will then offer a couple criticisms along with a qualified
endorsement of Weisberg’s brief for interpretive fidelity to positive law, informed
by humane commitments to text, law, and moral rectitude.
I. Richard Weisberg on Captain Vere
I want to revisit Weisberg’s argument from thirty five years ago regarding
Billy Budd, and more specifically, the character of Captain Vere, highlighting features
of it that have proven to be pivotal to his recent philosophical ambitions, but placing
them, for these purposes, in the jurisprudential background against which he wrote.
First, recall that Captain Vere, as a commanding officer on a ship of war, was faced
with what appeared to be a straightforward albeit excruciating moral dilemma,
familiar both to lawyers and literary readers since the time of Sophocles’ Antigone:
by killing Claggart, the popular sailor Billy Budd had unquestionably committed a
capital offense, but seemed nevertheless morally innocent. Budd apparently lacked
all criminal, much less homicidal intent; he simply was not deserving of the death
sentence the Laws of War apparently prescribed. Vere fully recognized Budd’s
moral innocence, even referring to Budd at one point as an “Angel of God.”5 Thus,
“natural law,” or “moral law,” or God’s law, or simple human decency, all seemed to
dictate the wisdom for some degree of leniency toward Budd: one should not, after
all, kill innocents. The positive law, however, consisting of the Mutiny Act and the
Laws of War, seemingly characterized the killing of a superior officer as both a strict
liability and capital offense, thus proscribing the death penalty for what was
basically an unintentional act, or at least, so Vere claimed. And what was Captain
Vere’s response to this dilemma? No M.L. King-ian civil disobedient he, Vere viewed
his highest duty as obedience to the Crown, and hence to the positive law, not to the
dictates of morality, God, common sense, decency, the popular will, or conscience.
He viewed his duty, in other words, as running to the positive law, not to natural
law. He had a moral obligation to obey and apply even a terribly unjust law – or a
law that would be unjust as applied. Vere accordingly argued for and obtained a
verdict of guilt and a sentence of death – all unreviewable – from his jury, which in
turn consisted of officers below him in the chain of command.
How should the reader view Vere for this terrible decision – the decision to
enforce a manifestly unjust law, at the expense of a sailor’s life? Did Vere do the
right thing? Very generally, we can identify three competing understandings of Billy
Budd, each implying different conceptions of Vere and Vere’s character, in the
secondary literature on the story that focused at all on the law, and that were
circulating in legal or literary academic circles, by the time Weisberg undertook his
HERMAN MELVILLE, Billy Budd, Foretopman: What Befell Him in the Year of the Great
Mutiny, in BARTLEBY THE SCRIVENER, BENITO CERNO, BILLY BUDD 236 (Quality Paperback
Book Club ed. 1996) (1924) hereinafter “Billy Budd.”
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study of the novella in the 1980s. On the first and most conventional view – and the
view that likely dominated through the middle of the twentieth century – Billy Budd,
and Melville himself, can be read as basically endorsing Vere’s unpopular decision.
It was necessary to preserve order, and therefore it was not only justified, but
morally required.6 Vere’s highest duty, after all, as a Commander on a Ship of War as
well as an adjudicator, ran both to the law and to military order – not to God, natural
law, or to individual conscience. As Vere himself suggested in his closing argument
to his drumhead jury, his position was thus most unlike a judge acting under a landbased law, who may have recourse to doctrines of equity, which might ameliorate
the harshness of a sentence, or a sentimental woman overly sensitive to the
demands and niceties of sympathy.7 He, by contrast to both, did not have the luxury
to succumb to the seductions of ordinary morality. As a responsible commander on
a ship of war, he could not allow his construction of the positive law, which he was
duty bound to uphold, to be tempered by the tug of sympathy or concerns for
justice.8 His moral duty was to uphold the law, even in the face of a justice that
would seemingly require him to repel it. Vere, then, most of Melville’s professional
readers concurred, was right to uphold the law and execute Billy, thus maintaining
order and preventing mutiny. He was right to do so, furthermore, even in the face of
justice, natural law, God’s law, equity, equitable principles, common sense morality,
the popular will, his own conscience, and the reservations of his hand-picked jurors
– all of which, again as Vere himself acknowledged, seemed to dictate a different
result.
Read this way, the story, along with this interpretation of it, stands in the
post-war period as a quite depressing brief for the moral as well as practical
necessity of order and obedience to hierarchical and particularly governmental
commands, particularly in times of emergency, and the duty of those in positions of
command to uphold discipline. That moral necessity for authority, discipline,
obedience, and order imposes upon commanders, and leaders, a role-dictated duty
to follow the positive law – a duty, in turn, to positive law which is only seemingly
paradoxically “higher” than any duty to “higher” or natural law; it is a duty, in short,
of politically empowered people to maintain the positive legal authority that in turn
maintains order, even when unjust. Vere heard the clarion call of duty-to-law over
justice, and should be commended for doing so. He was a tragic hero. More simply,
he was a good man who did the right thing under trying circumstances. Thus – Billy
Budd, on this reading, is all about the moral necessity of law and order over justice,
in case of conflict, and of a role-governed morality that calls upon those in charge to
uphold it, even at the expense of their own conscience. Billy Budd Sailor, again on
this conventional reading, is Melville’s highly peculiar, even idiosyncratic, and
6
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decidedly anti-romantic ode to the virtue and necessity of strong political and legal
authority, at least in times of national emergency.
The second possible interpretation is a sort of counter to this proauthoritarian interpretation. One could understand Vere, and presumably many of
those high school and college students who read Billy Budd Sailor in their teenage
years do read Vere, as having made the wrong choice, albeit for understandable, if
not justifiable, reasons, as evidenced by the clear fact it is a choice which he later
comes to deeply regret. Faced with a clear conflict between the dictates of the law
and the dictates of justice – or between human and natural law – a commander
should sometimes choose the latter, and perhaps even regardless of consequences,
if the conflict is sufficiently grave.9 Law, after all, even in times of war, exists so as to
serve justice, not the other way around, so if law in its application is thwarting
justice, and one has the power to circumvent law without courting utter
catastrophe, one should do so. Vere opted for positive law over natural law, and for
order over justice, but he was wrong to do so, and for that he should be faulted. He
should have disobeyed the law, the King, and the dictates of his role-dictated duty, if
he had to, in order to follow the dictates of a higher moral law, or the dictates of
conscience. Justice trumps law. The demands of order and political authority only
go so far. Had he recognized this and acted accordingly, he would have been truly
heroic. Vere failed this test of character, albeit, perhaps, for noble reasons: he was,
after all, looking not only to uphold the law and the King’s authority, but also to
prevent a mutiny. He opted for peace over justice. But it was nevertheless a moral
failure.
Although they are seemingly polar, note that both of these readings of Billy
Budd – Vere as a noble commander who did the right thing by following the positive
law although natural law and justice were seemingly against him, or Vere as having
done the wrong thing in following the law, albeit for understandable reasons – rest
on the same view of the governing law, and even of the relation of that law to
morality, even as they differ in their assessment of Vere’s decision and character.
Both rest on the claim, or understanding, or assumption, that the positive law that
bound Vere, and commanded Budd’s execution, was both clear and unjust. Budd
had admittedly killed a superior officer, which was defined as a strict liability
offense under the Articles of War, and for which death was the proscribed penalty.
The problem was that Budd was seemingly morally innocent. The two
interpretations summarized above differ over the moral merits of Vere’s resolution
of the conflict he faced, but they rested on the same view of its nature: a just
commander who earnestly tries to do his duty, when “doing one’s duty” entails
applying an unjust law. To follow the law is to offend justice, while to do the just
thing requires acting contrary to law. Vere opted to follow the law, at the cost of
justice. Perhaps he did so rightly, perhaps wrongly, but that was the conflict he
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faced. That conflict – the conflict between law and justice, between one’s duty to
law and one’s moral duty – in other words, is what Melville’s last novella is all about.
I will call both of these interpretations of Vere’s dilemma, jointly, the
“conventional account.” I do not mean by doing so to minimize their differences: the
norm underlying the former interpretation, if elaborated and particularly if it comes
to define a stance toward the state, can veer toward an unpleasant authoritarian
statism, while the norm underlying the latter can obviously lean toward an
endorsement of an unacceptably anarchic and overly individualized mode of civil
and judicial disobedience. The second understanding of Vere may be more pleasing
to a post-civil rights and post-Vietnam War era generation, while the former,
perhaps, may be more pleasing or at least more intelligible to that greatest
generation who glimpsed the horrors of world-scale war. Nevertheless, both
understandings share a completely conventional account of the law that generated
the conflict. Both accounts share the view that the governing law was clear, that it
clearly condemned Budd’s act, and clearly supported Vere’s decision to execute him.
On the conventional account, no matter which way its resolved, the dilemma
Melville’s story dramatizes, is the moral quandary faced by a commander or a judge
(rather than simply a citizen) who must obey or disobey – or apply, or refuse to
apply – a manifestly unjust legal command.
In the early 1980s, this conventional account of Vere, and of Billy Budd, began
to unravel, first in the literary academy, and then, eventually, in the legal. The first
crack in the conventional legal-academic view of Vere, however, came not from
Richard Weisberg, but from the renowned critical legal scholar and Yale Law
Professor Robert Cover. In a short but thoughtful and influential aside in the
preface of his masterful work Justice Accused,10 Cover offered an interpretation of
Billy Budd Sailor, and of the governing law in Billy Budd, that was strikingly different
from both of the conventional views recapitulated above, and that in turn heavily
influenced Weisberg’s reading a few years later. The conventional account of Vere’s
dilemma, Cover argued in Justice Accused, rested on a naïve view of the nature of the
actual law in the novella, and perhaps a naïve view of law generally. The law –
maybe any law, but certainly including the Laws of War as presented by Vere – is
indeterminate, Cover argued, its mandate was not, in fact, clear-cut. Those laws
could be read so as to require Budd’s execution, but other possible interpretations,
more generous to Budd, were available, and would have been available to the
bookish Vere, as both an astute reader of texts, including legal texts, and a sensitive
commander. So, Cover argued, the premise of the conventional account was simply
false: the presumably unjust law that generated the moral dilemma, was in point of
fact not at all clear, so it can hardly be faulted for being unjust. The Laws of War that
governed Budd’s fate and Vere’s dilemma did indeed present Vere with a choice –
but it was not the choice, as conventionally understood, between the “duty to
faithfully apply the law” and the “duty to further justice,” or a choice between
obedience or disobedience. Rather, the indeterminacy of the Laws of War – again,
perhaps the indeterminacy of law itself – presented Vere with an interpretive choice
10
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regarding how to understand the law’s command. The power, then, that Vere
wielded was not the severely constrained power to obey or disobey the governing
law, but rather, the much more widely accepted – even by his own superiors –
power to interpret.
That interpretive power, in turn, gave Vere a degree of freedom, whether he
wanted to acknowledge it or not. Vere had the choice, and hence the freedom, to
interpret the law either generously, or not, against Budd. Yet, Vere consistently,
repeatedly, denied he had that freedom and that choice, he consistently described
the law governing his actions as clear and mandatory, unambiguous, and
determinate. Vere’s moral flaw, then, was pointedly and classically existential, or
Sartrean; it was in his denial of his own freedom. The law presented him with an
interpretive choice, and therefore a degree of freedom, which he consistently and
adamantly denied he possessed. He did not have to kill Billy Budd, Cover urged, the
law did not “make him” do it. The law did not in fact constrain his freedom. He did
not have to disobey the law in order to save Budd’s life. The law, as a text, precisely
because of its indeterminacy, if anything, expanded Vere’s power and freedom. Vere
executed Billy Budd, and Vere chose to execute Billy Budd, and then he denied that
that act was his own. He ascribed it, rather, and falsely, to law.
Now: on Weisberg. Cover wrote Justice Accused – a treatment of the
interpretive choices faced by – and denied by – abolitionist judges in the prebellum
period with respect to the Fugitive Slave Act, who Cover famously analogized to
Captain Vere – in 1975.11 In his essays on Billy Budd that first appeared in law
reviews in 1979, and which were later collected in his first book Failure of the Word,
Weisberg referenced and praised Cover’s critical reading of the law in BBS, and his
existentialist critique of the bookish starry-eyed Vere.12 He then, however, provided
his own quite distinctive interpretation, that also focused on the law, and Vere’s
relation to it, as had Cover, but that differed in quite profound ways as much from
Cover’s critical account, as from the conventional account that had preceded both of
them. With Cover, Weisberg argued that Vere had grotesquely misstated the law, in
order to wrongly justify his execution of Billy Budd. But contra Cover’s account,
Weisberg argued that the Law of War under which Vere acted was not in fact
indeterminate, presenting Vere with an interpretive choice, although it was most
assuredly complex and subtle. But, importantly, for Weisberg, it was not
indeterminate. Nor, though, contra the conventionalist account, did the law support
Vere’s decision to execute the sentence without appellate review, and in fact quite
the opposite. Rather, the law, Weisberg argued, clearly required procedural
regularities that Vere ignored, all intended to protect against a rush to judgment in
the face of a perceived emergency – precisely the situation on board the Bellipotent
that Vere exploited.13 Had Vere followed the actual law rather than his own
misstatement of it, he would have maintained the status quo on ship, holding Budd
in place until a land court could have been convened, that would have then been
required to conduct both a much fuller and a much fairer process. The Law of War –
11
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the law Vere wrongly claimed bound his hands and proscribed Budd’s death – in fact
required as much. Vere was wrong in his claim that the law required Budd’s
execution; in fact, that body of law forbade it. Vere acted, then, in contravention of a
clear legal mandate, not in accordance with it.
Vere’s mistake, however, was not innocent, and this is the heart of
Weisberg’s argument. Vere, Weisberg argued, was not mistaken about the law,
rather, he misstated the law, and he did so intentionally. For psychic and
professional reasons both, Vere needed a very public and even tragic but
nevertheless legalistic triumph over adversity, and he used the law, a vague threat of
mutiny, and Budd’s lethal act, to engineer one. Thus, on Weisberg’s reading, Vere
executed a beloved sailor, and managed to accomplish the execution with no
subsequent uprising, and he did it all in apparent accordance with law and duty and
contrary to the dictates of the expressed sentiment of both his jurors and Budd’s
fellow sailors. He did it, though, in order to win acclaim and recognition by his peers
and his superiors – not out of any felt or actual duty to apply the law, achieve justice,
avert a mutiny, or maintain order, or express loyalty to the King.14 He did it out of a
thirst for personal aggrandizement.
The contrast with the conventional account is clear enough: Weisberg is the
only theorist when he first wrote who argued for Vere’s criminality rather than his
heroism. Let me stress here, though, the difference with Cover’s reading, which is
considerably more subtle. Vere, on Weisberg’s view, was not simply acting in bad
faith, failing to see indeterminacy in a legal command, and hence a choice rather
than a mandate. The problem Weisberg was stressing was not the one now familiar
to us after years of indeterminacy critiques: that the law’s indeterminacy permitted
him a more generous interpretation than the one he wrongly believed mandated the
harsh result. The problem the novella presents was not that Captain Vere believed
himself bound where he in fact was not; that he could not or refused to see that his
interpretation was a chosen one among possibilities. It wasn’t that he was denying
or blind to his own decisional freedom. Rather, the problem the novella presents is
that Vere lied about the meaning of the law in a context in which he possessed the
authority to render binding edicts, and he did so in order to achieve a personally
desired end. His mendacity laid in his intentional abuse of his interpretative power.
The problem was characterological, not existential.
The moral failing in Vere that his misreading and then misrepresentation of
the law suggests, therefore, according to Weisberg, was interpretive disingenuity,
not interpretive bad faith. Vere misled his shipmen, his jurors, Billy Budd himself,
his peers, his superiors, and his subordinates, over the meaning of the law to which
they all owed allegiance, and he did it in a way that served his own personal ends.
Far from sacrificing conscience to the higher end of legal duty, therefore, Vere
sacrificed legal duty, professionalism, justice, and positive and natural law both -- all
for his own personal gain. He did it in the guise of legal duty, but the law which
purportedly required him to do this unjust thing and to which he claimed allegiance
was a perverted artifact of his own construction. The actual law was not unjust; nor
Contrast Lawrence Friedman, who understands Vere’s motivation as fear, rather than
envy or jealousy. See Friedman, supra note 3, at 67.
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was it indeterminate or even particularly unclear. Vere was simply corrupt. The
manifestation as well as the vehicle of his corruption was his perversion of the law.
Now, why was Weisberg’s contrarian interpretation of BB – that the positive
law itself in Billy Budd Sailor was not the problem, that the law in fact was both
relatively just and relatively clear, and that it was Vere – law’s interpreter – who was
unjust, and that he was unjust because of his departure from law, not from his
cribbed allegiance to it – so novel, or surprising? Why didn’t more readers, and
particularly more legal readers, see in Melville’s story at least the possibility that
Vere misstated the law and that it was Vere, rather than the law, that was unjust?
Well, maybe Weisberg was just wrong about the Laws of War and integrity of the
text on this interpretation; Judge Posner for one argued as much.15 Without rearguing the point, in my view, Weisberg has successfully responded.16 A number of
legally trained readers now concur. 17
I want to suggest another hypothesis: at least one reason we have been so
blind to Vere’s misrepresentations of law in BBS, lies not in the text of BB itself, but
rather, in the state of our twentieth century jurisprudence. The accounts of Vere
given above, circa 1980 – Vere as noble commander forced to do an unpalatable act
by virtue of duty, Vere as commander who lacked the wherewithal to resist an
unjust law, or Vere as commander who failed to see or acknowledge his own
interpretive power to read the law in a more generous way – are strikingly, and
uncoincidentally, consistent with the major jurisprudential movements of the
middle and the late twentieth century that then circulated in the legal academy.
That jurisprudence constituted, in its totality, a massive shroud around Vere’s
mendacity. We couldn’t see that mendacity, in short, because the various
understandings of the nature of law then available to us obfuscated Vere’s
distinctive, and distinctively villainous, character. If Weisberg’s claims about the
novel are correct, then Vere exhibited a vice which was obscured, and badly, by
twentieth century jurisprudence, in its entirety. It has similarly obscured the same
of Vere’s real world counterparts.
Let me start with the jurisprudence of mid-century, during which what I
called the “conventional view” of Vere, and of Billy Budd, took hold. Law was
regarded by most major theorists in the mid-twentieth century years as relatively
determinate, knowable, clear, and as at least sometimes unjust. It therefore
confronted adjudicators, at least from time to time, with moral dilemmas of just the
sort Vere faced under the conventional account: whether to apply an unjust law,
thus upholding the ideal of fidelity to law, or, instead, to refuse to apply it, doing an
unlawful act so as to serve justice. Perhaps the central philosophical and moral
issue posed by law, not only for citizens but more pointedly and in a quite different
way for judges and commanders alike, during this time period, was what someone,
such as a judge, should do, in the face of unjust laws. For some legal positivists,
notably H.L.A. Hart, the possibility of a clear and clearly unjust law suggested in a
fairly straightforward way that while judges for the most part may be duty bound to
15
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apply the law as they find it, on occasion, a judge might indeed be morally justified
in refusing, or even morally required to refuse, to apply a virulently unjust law – a
judge, for example, facing a “Jewish law” in Vichy France or Hitler’s Germany.18 For
some natural lawyers, notably John Finnis and Lon Fuller, albeit in very different
ways, a judge ought also generally apply the law, but again at least on occasion he or
she might be not only justified but might be obligated to refuse to apply the unjust
law, albeit on the more intellectually complex ground that a radically unjust law
should not be understood as truly “lawful,” or as having binding force.19 I’m not
taking a position on this classical positivist-natural law debate. Whatever one’s
views on these questions, the dilemma discussed, and debated, by natural lawyers
and positivists alike throughout much of the middle of the twentieth century was
precisely the dilemma facing Vere under the conventionalist account described
above: how a commander, or a judge, should act, or decide, in the face of a clear but
unjust legal mandate. The problem of the unjust law, and the judge’s relation to it,
dominated jurisprudence. It could fairly be called, in fact, the central question of
classical jurisprudence.
In the 1970s and 1980s, however, this conception of jurisprudence, and what
is or isn’t its central question, shifted. Both the liberal legal scholarship that
dominated constitutional jurisprudence of the seventies and eighties, and then in a
much more dramatic way the critical legal scholarship that captured the imagination
of law’s critics in the eighties and nineties, upended mid-century jurisprudential
debates by denying the one premise that was shared by natural lawyers and
positivists alike: that the law itself – at least sometimes, probably most of the time,
and arguably all of the time – is in fact relatively clear, or determinate. Both liberal
legalists and critical scholars, although in very different ways and toward different
ends, denied just this assumption. Echoing, or indeed following, Robert Cover, a
successive generations of liberal and critical scholars argued – or simply assumed –
that the law, contra the conventional view of mid-century, is much of the time or
possibly always, radically indeterminate rather than clear.20 If that is right, then the
central moral dilemma faced by a judge (or commander), or adjudicator, is not
whether or not to refuse to apply an unjust law. Rather, the central moral dilemma
faced by the adjudicator (whether judge or commander) is how to interpret, and
then proclaim, an indeterminate law, and how to do so in the face of radically
indeterminate legal materials, and, perhaps, whether the degree to which one’s own
freedom to pick one possible interpretation over another should be openly
acknowledged. Liberal legal scholars and critical scholars have famously differed
over their answers to these questions for the last forty years: for liberal legalists, the
judge facing apparently indeterminate legal texts should resolve the indeterminacy
18
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by reference to background moral principles drawn from law itself that render the
text both determinate and just. For some, and particularly for Ronald Dworkin and
the generation of constitutional lawyers that followed him on this, law should even
be defined in such a way as to include those background moral principles.21 For
critical scholars, following the legal realists from the early part of the century, a
judge should forthrightly acknowledge the indeterminacy of law, and then resolve
open questions in such a way as to promote his or her own view, all things
considered, of wise social policy. Again, I don’t mean to minimize these differences.
But they share this common ground: for both liberal legalists and critical scholars,
the central problem of jurisprudence is not the moral dilemma presented to a judge
by virtue of an unjust law. Rather, the central jurisprudential dilemma – and hence
the central question of jurisprudence, is, rather, the indeterminate law, and the
central moral dilemma posed by that indeterminacy is not the unjust law, but the
indeterminate one. For neither liberal nor critical scholars of the last quarter of the
last century, has the duplicitous adjudicator, faced with relatively clear and
relatively good law, but with personal motivations that might cloud judgment,
appeared as the, or even a, central concern.
Thus, Weisberg’s novel interpretation of Billy Budd – that the law was
basically sound and that Vere’s criminality was manifested in his intentionally
perverse representation of the law – rested on a Weisbergian view of the moral
perils of judging that went against the grain of our legal theory at least from the
middle of the century through the 1990s, both conventional and critical, and
possibly further back: recall that Oliver Wendell Holmes, the leading jurisprude of
what Weisberg would now call “flexibility” in judging – famously opined that legal
indeterminacy and policy-based judicial decision-making is not a cause for concern,
basically because judges are, as a group, “wise and good men.”22 The badly
motivated, duplicitous, criminal or untrustworthy adjudicator was just not much of
a target of legal scholarship, or even of concern; the legal realists wanted judges to
craft decent policy going forward, liberal legalists wanted judges to fairly apply
moral principles to fill gaps in law, and critical theorists have famously espoused the
necessity as well as virtue of overtly politicized judicial decision-making. None
worried over the unjust adjudicator; all worried, instead, over the need to free the
judge’s hand to craft wise policy, from both the internal and external forces dictating
a false legal necessity. Thus, putting this together, for the conventional legal
theorists from mid-century, both natural lawyers and positivists, the focus of
concern was the adjudicator faced with an unjust law, and for the liberal legal and
critical theorist of the 80s and 90s, the problematic adjudicator was the adjudicator
who either failed to incorporate relevant moral principles into law or failed to
acknowledge or didn’t see law’s indeterminacy, and thus didn’t acknowledge his
own freedom. The critic’s focus was the adjudicator who acted in bad faith, rather
than the adjudicator who manipulated law so as to achieve his own personal and
duplicitous ends. Through the eighties and nineties, the formative years of law and
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humanities, Weisberg was essentially the only major legal theorist looking at the
duplicitous and disingenuous adjudicator – the judge, lawyer, or military
commander who misrepresented legal texts and then manipulated legal process
toward his own personal ends, rather than the upright adjudicator faced with an
unjust law or the adjudicator faced with unacknowledged indeterminacy. He found
that ressentiment-driven and duplicitous adjudicator in Melville’s Vere, but by no
means only there: he found him in Chief Justice Rehnquist and his early opinions,23
in Justice Scalia’s second amendment decisions,24 in a number of canonical works of
fiction,25 and most importantly, in the writings of the early Christians, notably Paul
and John’s manipulative construction of Christianity on the basis of their intentional
misreading of earlier religious texts.26 The wordy and educated man of law and
letters can wield texts in ways intended to fulfill personal and perverse ends, and
when he does so his erudite abilities and training become weapons of wanton
destruction. Weisberg in effect introduced us to this character, in literature, in
religion, and most persistently and most persuasively in law: the legally empowered
man of texts and words, who abuses both to achieve his personal ends.
II. Weisberg on Flexiphobia in Law and Literature
Weisberg’s condemnation of Vere, it should be recalled, rested on his
manipulation of legal texts to achieve personal ends – not on the nature of the
personal ends themselves. Ambition alone – what drove Vere – is hardly a vice.
There’s nothing terrible, or terrifying, about his jealousy of Admiral Nelson, or his
desire to make a mark in his country’s military history, or his desire to be
recognized for it. Misstating the law so as to facilitate the execution of an innocent
in order to further those ends, however, is. The ressentiment-driven, overly
ambitious, bookish and careerist Vere, looking to achieve basically a PR victory for
his own personal ends, manipulated the law so as to execute a morally innocent
sailor, claiming to quell a likely nonexistent threat of mutiny. In his essays on BBS,
Weisberg focused heavily on the character of Vere, and the mens rea, so to speak, of
his crime: the frame of mind which drives a legally empowered person – a lawyer,
judge, commander – to misstate or manipulate legal texts so as to achieve selfaggrandizing personal ends. In subsequent writing, however, and particularly in In
Praise of Intransigence, Weisberg has focused far more on Vere’s actual act, or actus
res: the manipulation of texts, and the legal, social and cultural damage that
manipulation of texts occasions. In the latter book, as well as in other recent
writing, Weisberg isolates and specifices Vere’s actus reus with greater particularity:
the misstatement, by someone with legal authority, and in the guise of performing
an act of legal “interpretation,” of the relevant law, in order to achieve extraneous
23
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and usually personal ends. That act is then masked by a cultural-legal stance toward
law that permits or encourages “flexibility” in interpretation of texts, and it is that
permissive stance, more than the particular acts, that is his ultimate target. In his
book, Weisberg criticizes flexibility in all sorts of interpretive enterprises, not just
the legal. In this context, however, I will refer to his target as interpretive legal
flexibility. Let me review some of the harms of the flexibility in legal interpretation
that Weisberg in my view correctly condemns, add just one, and then suggest some
clarification of the basic thesis, which I believe is easily subject to misreading.
As with his claim regarding Vere’s villainy, however, the first thing to note
regarding Weisberg’s condemnation of interpretive legal flexibility – and, on the flip
side, his praise of “flexiphobia,” which I will re-label “interpretive intransigence” – is
its extraordinary oddity. It is quite an understatement to note that virtually any
critique of interpretive flexibility in law goes against the grain of what is now fully
conventional, post-legal realist, academic and juridical jurisprudential thinking. The
praise of intransigence and the condemnation of flexibility both seemingly support
precisely the stubbornness, rigidity, and hidebound, reflexive, precedent-bound
legal traditionalism which Oliver Wendell Holmes famously found so odious in too
many of his peers on the Bench: there is no worse reason to decide a case in a
particular way, Holmes opined, than that it was so decided in the time of Henry the
IV.27 Judge Posner echoes the sentiment nearly a hundred years later: flexiphobia is
the heart of the “legal formalism” that Posner and an entire generation of likeminded legal pragmatists have routinely condemned, both in judges and academics:
the belief, grounded in superstition or childishness, that judges should decide cases
primarily or exclusively by reference to pre-existing law, rather than by flexibly
employing the law to defend conclusions reached on forward looking, pragmatic,
and generally utilitarian grounds.28 That “formalist” reliance on existing law,
faithfully applied, rather than forward looking policy, as the better and indeed the
only truly legal grounds for judicial decision making has been the target of legal
realists, critical legal scholars, and (for different reasons) liberal legalists and legal
economists now for a hundred years; indeed, their shared contempt of formalism is
the only ground these otherwise disparate jurisprudential approaches to law share.
What Weisberg embraces – intransigence – is what is near-universally condemned
or ridiculed as on the ashbin of history, and what he dubs and then damns as
flexibility, in law, is what is now almost universally regarded as enlightened,
forward-looking judicial thought.
Why this broad consensus? Obviously, or so its thought, intransigence in law
risks all of the perceived sins of bullheadedness for which its ridiculed in life
generally. Law, furthermore, by its nature, is already inescapably conservative – it
seeks to preserve some aspect of the social world against change simply by
subjecting it to rule. Perhaps in part for that reason, legal flexibility, not
intransigence, is the well-understood path of the law for our common-law governed
fields: law, which seeks to preserve, must also evolve, and flexibility seems like the
best stance to facilitate that evolution. So – our common law of tort, contract,
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property and the principles that govern them have grown, shrunk, and changed, to
accommodate the needs of industry, agriculture, commerce and technology. They
all have proven sufficiently flexible to respond to changing political and economic
pressures, without the constant need for legislative revisions. More profoundly,
constitutional law, at least in the United States, has evolved, the efforts of originalists
notwithstanding, to meet the changing mores and fundamental values of the people
whose law it governs, and it has done so, generally, in a progressive and morally
sound direction. Without flexibility, we would never have had Brown v Board of
Education29 or Roe v Wade:30 the Constitution says nothing of segregated schools or
rights to abortion. Only by reading the Constitution flexibly, could we achieve these
great gains in our civil rights of equality and liberty. For these reasons and a host of
others, we teach the virtue of legal flexibility, so to speak, reflexively in law school
classes: common law rules develop by absorbing by analogy new fact patterns, and
through the process, facilitating the articulation of new concepts, which grow from
but which are by no means bound by their origin. Intransigence is little more than a
thorn in the side of a forward-looking judiciary respectful of but not constrained by
historical precedent. In a post realist world, it is virtually the antithesis of the
judicious temperament. Given all of this, why would anyone praise intransigence?
Why does Weisberg?
Weisberg puts forward a number of arguments against flexibility generally,
which I won’t touch on here, but he also asserts two very general arguments against
legal flexibility, both of which are implied in his early writing on Billy Budd and his
analysis of Vere. I will grossly simplify them here, and then offer a comment. First,
the valorization of legal flexibility which we have, as an academy, engaged, from the
time of the legal realists to the present, masks precisely the kinds of legal
malfeasance that Vere represents – the ressentiment-driven man of words, books,
and letters, who is empowered by law, and who, for deeply personal and
psychological reasons, is envious and resentful of natural strength, beauty, life,
force, and power.31 With interpretive flexibility, and even more so with the
boundless indeterminacy championed by critical scholars, comes less – not more –
ground for addressing, or even claiming, the wrongness of this kind of lethal
manipulativeness. Yes, it is certainly true that the judge facing indeterminate law
cannot claim to be constrained by it – Vere’s decision, as Cover pointed out, was his,
not “the law’s.” If we assume legal indeterminacy, then Vere and others in his
position are deprived of the excuse, so to speak, that “the law made me do it.” But,
at the same time, the judge who has and who is assumed to have only indeterminate
legal materials at hand is freed of all responsibility for fidelity. He cannot possibly
have an obligation to follow the law, if the law provides no determinate guidance.
Now of course, this unquestionably does happen from time to time, simply given the
nature of rules and language: as H. L. A. Hart argued, judges who must decide cases
in the gray or penumbral area of legal uncertainty must act to some degree
essentially as a legislator. But if we simply presume that all law is by its nature
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indeterminate – that all law is essentially in the gray area -- and that flexibility is a
judicial virtue, rather than an occasional necessity, then the unmoored judge
becomes the norm – indeterminate law requires essentially nothing of him. He can
be, and should be, flexible: he can respond to changing circumstances, he can be
“pragmatic,” he can weigh costs and benefits, he can apply moral principles, he can
do the best thing all things considered. He can also, however, be unhinged, as was
Vere. If we assume the necessity and the universality of the untethered judge,
because we assume the invariability of legal indeterminacy, then we will mask, to
some degree, the potential venality of that most unjudicious judicial character.
Thus, the first cost of flexiphilia: we will not recognize the Captain Veres in our legal
world, whether they are on the Supreme Court or lower courts, because we will
come to see their peculiar form of verbal manipulativeness as the norm. This is no
small matter. Law is precisely the institution, and the profession, that should
ideally, and minimally, constrain political perversion and abuse of power, and it
should do so through the affirmative but confining powers of words. If we adopt a
stance toward its interpretation that robs us of the linguistic capacity to do so, we
will have stripped the institution of law of its moral purpose and capacities.
The second claim is more subtle, and also, I think, considerably more
problematic. Weisberg’s flexiphobia – his praise of intransigence – urges on us a
faith, not only in cultural texts, but also, basically, in law, at least as a kind of
baseline, or presumption. Faith in law, in turn, is grounded in the larger
Weisbergian faith in texts, language, and the binding powers of words, at least when
they are interpreted in a way that accords weight to fidelity.32 But the same vehicle
– words – become the weapon of the resentful, erudite, destructive Vere; words,
then, are the quintessential double edged swords. When words fail to bind us –
perhaps because of dishonesty, but perhaps more pervasively because of our love of
flexibility, or what might be called our flexiphilia – then law fails to bind us, which,
Weisberg argues, might be liberating on occasion but will far likely prove to be
calamitous.33 When the word loses its binding power – when we are faced with a
“Failure of the Word,” as he titled his first and most important book, then law’s
claim to being a moral constraint on psychic perversion and political harm
disappears. It becomes that which it would otherwise constrain; a vehicle for the
abuse of both the weak by the strong, but also of the naturally strong by the weak:
the weak, this time, that somehow attains legal power, and whose weakness is then
strengthened by the hand of erudition and legal empowerment, put to perverse
ends.
Best understood, both the power and the virtue of law come not from the
point of the sword, but from the binding power of the Word – it is when law is
expressed through words that communicate that it has some essential and
redemptive connection toward equality and community both. Our faith in law is
rational, then, when it is a faith in law’s words: it is the Word that can morally
constrain us, but it only does so if we can morally interpret it – by so doing, we use it
to build as well as facilitate equalizing connections among us. When we lose our
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capacity to interpret the Word, and our understanding of that capacity, we lose,
basically, law’s institutional capacity to morally constrain us against our own
psychic perversions. I’d call the Weisbergian jurisprudential stance, therefore, not
so much a faith in Law, as a faith in Law’s Word, honestly rendered. Weisberg’s
argument, in its essence, is that faith in law is only justified if and when it rests on a
faith in Law’s Word, and that the latter depends entirely and with great fragility on a
capacity for honest and indeed inflexible interpretation.
Weisberg’s faith in Law’s Word is not bottomless, naïve, or unqualified –
although it might initially so appear. Infidelity to the Word, including to Law’s
words, can be calamitous, and therefore, interpretive flexibility can accommodate –
and mask – moral disaster, up to and most assuredly including genocide. That is
Weisberg’s basic brief. On the other hand, Law’s words – including Law’s original
texts – are not necessarily the heart of virtue, and Weisberg recognizes this: he
condemns in no equivocal or uncertain language apartheid regimes, such as the US
pre-bellum South,34 the denial of basic political rights for women in pre-19th
Amendment America,35 the Jewish laws of Vichy France during the rise of fascist
Europe,36 and of course the genocidal Jewish laws of the Third Reich.37 All of these
systems of oppression were grounded in law, and its texts and words. Weisberg
well recognizes the danger of legalized evil, including legalized genocide. He
recognizes likewise the danger of unthinking obedience to law, even when
scrupulously interpreted with utmost fidelity. He recognizes, in other words, that
the dangerousness of law lies not only in the license that a stance of interpretive
flexibility lends to the Captain Veres among us, but also in a stance of unreflective
obedience to it, when the Word that is its original text is malign. Nevertheless, the
possibility of malignant law does not undercut the dangers of flexible interpretation.
Richard Weisberg’s distinctive sensitivity, and the immense added value of his
writing to the jurisprudential canon, lies not in his recognition of law’s evil, but
rather in his recognition of law’s goodness, and of the dangers of infidelity toward it,
particularly when harbored by law’s custodians and guardians. That sensitivity, in
turn, is grounded not only in a healthy skepticism toward Vere and his ilk, but also
in a healthy appreciation of law’s value, in the hands of upright stewards.
Finally, my two qualifications, or clarifications. First, as suggested above, its
worth clarifying that Weisberg’s endorsement of interpretive intransigence is not
simply an endorsement of law – a sort of “law is law” version of legal positivism,
combined with an unyielding duty of obedience. It’s not clear that any legal
positivist holds such a view, but it is certain that Weisberg does not. He well
recognizes both the reality and the possibility of unjust law – of law that a citizen or
judge both might have not just a right but even a moral duty to disobey. What
Weisbergian intransigence does insist on, however, is intransigence in the act and
process of interpretation – of declaring the law – not blind obedience to it. Nothing
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follows at all, regarding a duty of obedience, from a duty of intransigent
interpretation. In fact, although Weisberg doesn’t elaborate the argument, one
virtue of the intransigent interpretation he’s calling for is that it makes clear, just as
flexible interpretation obfuscates, the need for disobedience, both of citizens and
judges – when immoral laws demand it. Sometimes a deep and intransigent
understanding of law – or Constitutions – yields a morally good result that for
whatever reason is not readily apparent from text. Weisberg may be right that
Brown v. Board is such a case. But sometimes, and Weisberg’s own faith in the US
Constitution notwithstanding, the deepest and most faithful and most intransigent
understanding of law yields a result so repugnant to morality or justice that a judge
is truly faced with the conflict that Vere falsely claimed: an irresolvable conflict
between the dictates of law and the requirements of justice. Nothing in Weisberg’s
faith in Law’s Word suggests that these conflicts will not occur, and that at times
that they will not be devastating. When a judge is faced with such a conflict, he or
she might decide to disobey – engage in an act of judicial disobedience – or step
down. But it is an attitude of interpretive intransigence – not interpretive flexibility
– that will isolate and clarify these conflicts.
Second, Weisberg sometimes labels his own position an endorsement of
intransigence (which I’ve re-labeled above “interpretive intransigence”) and in
other places, more pithily, “flexiphobia.” I prefer the former formulation, because it
references what he’s for rather than what he’s against, but there’s nevertheless an
important insight in the more negative word he’s coined. It may be that what we
should embrace, at least with respect to legal interpretation, is not so much
intransigence itself as an attitude: a skeptical stance toward interpretive claims that
turn out to depend upon or be rooted in nothing but the purported virtue of
flexibility. We should be most skeptical of claims in defense of far-fetched
adjudicative positions rooted in the claimed necessity of flexibility. But skepticism
toward either the wisdom or necessity of flexibility in interpretation is not the same
thing as intransigence. So, while the book is titled “In Praise of Intransigence,” that
is not quite what the book does. What it does, at least more consistently, is praise a
stance of skepticism toward claims based on the value or necessity of interpretive
freedom. Similarly, Weisberg consistently labels the target of his critique
“flexibility.” Here too, though, I think the better target is a stance, or an attitude, not
flexibility itself. We could call the position he’s targeting, for the sake of parallelism,
“flexiphilia.” Flexibility, after all, is often called for. Arguably, we couldn’t survive
without it. Flexibility itself is not evil, not even flexibility toward sacred or deeply
cherished texts. Flexiphilia, though, is different; it is an attitudinal predisposition
that assumes the necessity or virtue of flexibility in any and all circumstances. It is
that attitude transported into the legal context – the claim that legal texts can mean
anything or nothing, and therefore don’t really mean anything at all – that robs the
Legal Word, and therefore legal texts, and therefore law, of all morally redemptive
authority.
It is also that attitude – an attitudinal predisposition toward the claimed
necessity or virtue (or both) of flexible interpretation, all in defense of preposterous
decisions purportedly based in texts – and not flexibility per se – that has been
Richard Weisberg’s target throughout his career. Vere executes an innocent sailor
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and falsely claims authority by referencing a flexible interpretation of the Articles of
War. Saints John and Paul claim the foundation of a new religion in perverse
interpretations of sacred religious texts. Bush Administration lawyers claim
authority for torture by referencing loose interpretations of the Geneva
Conventions. Justice Scalia does likewise with respect to the Second Amendment
and the Right to Bear Arms. All of these actions are taken either in part or whole by
claiming authority for them in flexible interpretations of preexisting texts, rendered
by legally empowered actors responsible for preserving just those texts. Those
flexible interpretations, then, in turn, either justify or excuse or necessitate
otherwise pernicious actions. The actor then has the imprimatur and the additional
fire power of some form of law. The rest of us, when faced with the torture, or the
unreviewable execution of an innocent at sea, or the Jesus movement, or a
dangerously armed citizenry – are to some considerable degree incapacitated even
from criticizing these acts, in part by our now-widespread twentieth and twentyfirst century insistence that flexibility in legal interpretation is either a virtue or a
necessity, or quite possibly both. These actions, that is, are furthered, because
legitimated, by our flexiphilia.
Flexiphilia is neither a left nor right wing version of legalism, it is not clearly
aligned with either natural law or positivism. It is a pervasive feature of modern
legal thought, reflected not only in Posnerian pragmatism and Holmesian realism,
but also in the economic analysis of law, in critical scholars’ penchant for
indeterminacy, and in liberal legalism’s embrace, from Brown and Roe forward, of
principle and policy, rather than law and text, as the better guide for judicial
discretion. It has been Richard Weisberg’s life work to identify the shared ground –
flexiphilia – of these radically disparate positions – to alert us to the moral and
indeed existential danger in that stance, and to call us out on it. He has issued this
warning persuasively, eloquently, critically, and graciously. It would behoove us to
take heed.

18

